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There is much empirical evidence that words’ relative imageability and body-object inter-
action (BOI) facilitate lexical processing for concrete nouns (e.g., Bennett et al., 2011).
These findings are consistent with a grounded cognition framework (e.g., Barsalou, 2008),
in which sensorimotor knowledge is integral to lexical processing. In the present study,
we examined whether lexical processing is also sensitive to the dimension of emotional
experience (i.e., the ease with which words evoke emotional experience), which is also
derived from a grounded cognition framework.We examined the effects of emotional expe-
rience, imageability, and BOI in semantic categorization for concrete and abstract nouns.
Our results indicate that for concrete nouns, emotional experience was associated with
less accurate categorization, whereas imageability and BOI were associated with faster
and more accurate categorization. For abstract nouns, emotional experience was asso-
ciated with faster and more accurate categorization, whereas BOI was associated with
slower and less accurate categorization. This pattern of results was observed even with
many other lexical and semantic dimensions statistically controlled.These findings are con-
sistent with Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) theory of semantic representation, which states that
emotional knowledge underlies meanings for abstract concepts, whereas sensorimotor
knowledge underlies meanings for concrete concepts.
Keywords: emotional experience, imageability, body-object interaction, semantic richness, grounded cognition
INTRODUCTION
Classical theories of cognition hold that perception and cognition
have distinct representational formats, such that perceptual rep-
resentations are modal, whereas conceptual representations are
amodal (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984). More recently, a grow-
ing number of cognitive scientists have proposed an alternative
theoretical perspective, called embodied or grounded cognition,
in which modal representations underlie both perceptual and
conceptual knowledge (e.g., Pecher and Zwaan, 2005). One well-
developed and influential grounded cognition framework is per-
ceptual symbol systems (PSS: Barsalou, 1999). According to PSS,
conceptual knowledge is largely acquired through bodily interac-
tion with the environment and is inherently multimodal, such that
different aspects of conceptual knowledge are stored in different
neural systems dedicated to sensorimotor processing (e.g., sen-
sory knowledge is stored in neural systems dedicated to sensory
processing, whereas motor knowledge is stored in neural systems
dedicated to motor processing). Conceptual processing occurs via
simulation, or the partial reenactment of the various neural states
that were involved during bodily interaction with the environ-
ment. More recently, Barsalou (2003, 2008, 2009) has emphasized
that an important aspect of the acquisition and subsequent sim-
ulation of conceptual knowledge is that it does not occur in a
contextual vacuum. That is, “(a)t any given moment in percep-
tion, people perceive the immediate space around them, including
agents, objects, and events present” (Barsalou, 2009, p. 1283).
Barsalou (2003) referred to the fact that conceptual knowledge is
influenced by environmental context as situated conceptualization.
The PSS framework has recently been extended in empirical
efforts investigating whether sensorimotor knowledge influences
lexical processing. Several studies have examined the influence
of knowledge gained through sensory experience, as measured by
imageability (i.e., how easily words evoke mental images), in lexical
processing. Imageability has been shown to facilitate respond-
ing in lexical decision, word naming, picture naming, progressive
demasking, and semantic categorization tasks (Balota et al., 2004;
Bennett et al., 2011;Yap et al., 2012). Additional studies have exam-
ined the influence of knowledge gained through motor experience
in lexical processing, as indexed by a dimension known as body-
object interaction (BOI), which measures perceptions of the ease
with which a human body can physically interact with a word’s
referent. BOI has been shown to facilitate responding in lexi-
cal decision, phonological lexical decision, word naming, picture
naming, semantic categorization, and sentence processing tasks
(Siakaluk et al., 2008a,b; Tillotson et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2011;
Wellsby et al., 2011; Hansen et al., 2012; Phillips et al., 2012; Tou-
signant and Pexman, 2012; Yap et al., 2012). Further, in an fMRI
study involving the semantic categorization task (SCT), process-
ing of high BOI words was associated with greater activation in
the left inferior parietal lobule (supramarginal gyrus, BA 40), a
sensory association area involved in kinesthetic memory (Harg-
reaves et al., 2012). This finding suggests that knowledge about the
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relative availability of motor experience with words’ referents is
activated during visual word recognition. The facilitatory effects
of imageability and BOI arise, according to the PSS framework,
because easily imageable words and high BOI words refer to con-
crete concepts that occur in environmental contexts that allow
development of relatively rich stores of sensory knowledge and
motor knowledge, and elicit richer sensory simulations and motor
simulations. That is, by virtue of their associated sensory knowl-
edge and motor knowledge, easily imageable words and high BOI
words enjoy semantic richness.
The semantic feedback activation framework describes in more
explicit detail how semantic richness effects, such as the facil-
itatory effects of imageability and BOI, arise within the visual
word recognition system (Hino and Lupker, 1996; Pexman et al.,
2002). According to this framework, the visual word recognition
system is comprised of separate but interconnected sets of units
dedicated to processing orthographic, phonological, and seman-
tic information. In tasks in which responses are based primarily
on orthographic processing (e.g., lexical decision), semantically
richer words (i.e., easily imageable words and high BOI words)
generate greater levels of semantic activation (i.e., richer sensory
simulations and richer motor simulations) within semantic units,
which leads to greater semantic feedback activation to ortho-
graphic units, thus leading to faster responding for these words.
The same explanation holds in tasks in which responses are based
primarily on phonological processing (e.g., word naming), except
that the relevant semantic feedback activation is that which influ-
ences phonological units. In tasks in which responses are based
primarily on semantic processing (e.g., semantic categorization),
greater levels of semantic activation (i.e., richer sensory simula-
tions and richer motor simulations) generated by semantically
richer words (i.e., easily imageable words and high BOI words)
leads to faster settling of their associated semantic representa-
tions within semantic units. Notably, while many studies have
reported facilitatory effects of various semantic richness dimen-
sions in SCTs, it has also been established that the nature of these
effects will depend on the particular decision category involved,
and how the richness dimension is relevant to that category (e.g.,
Pexman et al., 2003; Tousignant and Pexman, 2012).
GROUNDING LEXICAL SEMANTICS BEYOND SENSORIMOTOR
KNOWLEDGE
Recently, it has been noted that researchers with a grounded cog-
nition perspective have focused primarily on the sensorimotor
aspects of cognition, and have largely ignored other types of
knowledge that are relevant to this perspective, such as the emo-
tional aspects of cognition (Vigliocco et al., 2009; Parisi, 2011).
This is an important consideration, because there is accumulat-
ing evidence that emotional knowledge plays a number of roles
in cognition more generally (Dolan, 2002; Vigliocco et al., 2009),
and in conceptual processing more particularly (Niedenthal et al.,
2005a,b, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).
Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011) extended the PSS framework
to account for how emotional concepts may be acquired through
bodily experience via situated conceptualization. That is, they sug-
gested that emotional knowledge is acquired and simulated in
the same manner in which sensorimotor knowledge is acquired
and simulated. They stated, “Like all concepts, emotion concepts
originate and operate in the context of continuous situated activ-
ity, with situations typically including a physical setting, agents,
objects, and actions in the world, interoceptive sensations from
the body, and mentalizing related to prospective and retrospective
thought” (p. 1108). Thus, although emotional knowledge can be
considered more abstract in nature than sensorimotor knowledge,
both types of knowledge are nonetheless acquired and simu-
lated through the same mechanisms. More specifically, emotional
knowledge is stored in the neural systems dedicated to emotional
processing, and conceptual processing of emotional knowledge
occurs through simulation, or the partial reenactment of the vari-
ous neural states that were involved during bodily interaction with
the environment.
Vigliocco et al. (2009) developed a similar framework, and
argued that emotional knowledge is grounded in bodily experience
and is integral to conceptual processing. According to Vigliocco
et al.’s (2009) framework of semantic representation, there are
two general classes of knowledge that humans are able to acquire
and use in conceptual processing. One type is what they refer to
as experiential knowledge and the other type is what they refer to
as linguistic knowledge. They characterize experiential knowledge
as being derived not only from sensory and motor experience
with the external environment, but also from affective or emo-
tional experience with the internal environment of one’s own
body (e.g., the experience of moods or feelings) in conjunction
with external events. They characterize linguistic knowledge as
lexical co-occurrence information (e.g., the Topics model, Grif-
fiths et al., 2007; the LSA model, Landauer and Dumais, 1997; the
HAL model, Lund and Burgess, 1996), and syntactic information1.
Importantly, they further propose that sensorimotor knowledge is
more salient to the acquisition and use of concrete concepts than
abstract concepts, whereas emotional knowledge and linguistic
knowledge types are more salient to the acquisition and use of
abstract concepts than concrete concepts. In other words, senso-
rimotor knowledge can be thought of as diagnostic of concrete
concepts, whereas emotional knowledge and linguistic knowledge
can be thought of as diagnostic of abstract concepts.
In support of the idea that emotional knowledge is integral to
the processing of abstract concepts in lexical processing, Kousta
et al. (2009) reported faster lexical decision latencies for negative
words and for positive words than for neutral words (there was no
difference in latencies between the negative words and the posi-
tive words). Importantly, these facilitatory effects of emotion were
independent of any influence of concreteness or imageability (all
three sets of words were matched on these two dimensions). In
addition, Kousta et al. (2011) reported an intriguing result they
called the abstractness effect. When imageability and context avail-
ability were statistically controlled, Kousta et al. (2011) reported
that lexical decision latencies were faster for abstract words than for
concrete words, in contrast to the typical finding whereby laten-
cies are faster for concrete words than for abstract words. They
attributed this reversal to the facilitatory influence of emotional
1See Barsalou et al. (2008) for a related framework they call Language and Situated
Simulation (LASS).
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content for abstract words. Thus, both Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) and
Wilson-Mendenhall et al.’s (2011) frameworks conceive emotional
knowledge as situationally and experientially derived, and we use
those characterizations to frame predictions in the current study.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the rel-
ative contributions of emotional, sensory, and motor knowledge
to semantic processing for concrete and abstract nouns. In doing
so, our objective was to test Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) claims that
emotional knowledge underlies the meanings of abstract nouns,
whereas sensory and motor knowledge underlies the meanings of
concrete nouns. More specifically, we assessed emotional knowl-
edge using a new dimension we call emotional experience, which
was designed to capture the relative ease with which words elicit
or evoke emotional experience. We assessed sensory knowledge
using the dimension of imageability, and we assessed motor knowl-
edge using the dimension of BOI. We examined the behavioral
effects of the above three dimensions in semantic categorization
for nouns referring to concrete concepts and for nouns referring
to abstract concepts. We characterized emotional experience as a
unitary dimension to make it analogous to imageability and BOI,
and thus to facilitate comparisons between these three dimensions
of experiential knowledge.
An example may help elucidate how different types of expe-
riential knowledge may underlie the development and activation
of concrete and abstract conceptual knowledge. Imagine a situa-
tion in which you are very thirsty and have been looking for some
time for something to drink. When you finally see a fountain, you
run to it, take a good drink of water, and feel relieved. This situa-
tion involves the concrete concept of “fountain” and the abstract
concept of “relief.” The concrete noun fountain can be consid-
ered easily imageable, because it refers to things that can be easily
perceived by the senses (e.g., sight, touch), and high on the BOI
dimension, because it also refers to things that can be easily phys-
ically interacted with (e.g., turning the knob to start the flow of
water, holding the fountain for balance, bending down to drink the
water). We suggest that fountain can be considered low on the emo-
tional experience dimension, because it is unlikely that it refers to
things that are reliably associated with relatively robust emotional
experiences (e.g., when one sees fountains, are they always associ-
ated with emotional experiences as they are with visual experiences
and motor experiences?). Thus, what people know about the con-
crete concept “fountain” will be derived primarily from sensory
experience and motor experience, and perhaps only secondarily
from emotional experience. Conversely, the abstract noun relief
can be considered high on the emotional experience dimension,
because it refers to the alleviation or deliverance from distress
(e.g., drinking water to quench thirst). Relief can also be consid-
ered not easily imageable, because it cannot be easily perceived by
the senses, and low on the BOI dimension, because it cannot be
easily physically interacted with (if at all). Thus, what people know
about the abstract concept “relief” will be derived primarily from
emotional experience, and perhaps only secondarily (if at all) from
sensory experience and motor experience.
According to Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) framework of seman-
tic representation, there is a “statistical preponderance for
sensory-motor information to underlie concrete word meanings
and a preponderance for affective (i.e., emotional). . .information
to underlie abstract word meanings” (p. 223). The implications
of these claims are that sensory knowledge and motor knowledge
should be especially salient to the processing of concrete nouns,
whereas emotional knowledge should be especially salient to the
processing of abstract nouns. We selected our stimuli to be either
concrete or abstract (described below), and presented these stimuli
in two separate tasks. In the concrete SCT, the decision criterion
was to decide if the stimuli referred to concrete nouns, whereas in
the abstract SCT, the decision criterion was to decide if the stimuli
referred to abstract nouns. We propose that there are two bene-
fits in using this experimental design. First, the decision criteria
allowed for a relatively more pure assessment of the effects of the
three dimensions of experiential knowledge than would a task such
as lexical decision. This is because each SCT directly emphasizes
processing of the relevant semantic characteristic under examina-
tion, namely concreteness in the concrete SCT and abstractness in
the abstract SCT, rather than requiring a more peripheral decision
to be made in lexical decision (e.g., is the item a word). Second, the
decision criteria allowed a more refined analysis of the individual
effects of each of the three dimensions of experiential knowledge
in each SCT. That is, according to the semantic feedback acti-
vation framework, the nature of the effects of any given semantic
richness dimension in the SCT will depend on whether the dimen-
sion is congruent with the decision category (Pexman et al., 2003;
Tousignant and Pexman, 2012).
As such, we made the following prediction regarding the effects
of imageability and BOI on the processing of concrete nouns in
the concrete SCT: both dimensions should facilitate categoriza-
tion, such that higher ratings on these two dimensions should be
associated with faster and more accurate categorizations, because
these two dimensions are diagnostic of concrete concepts, and
thus are congruent with the decision criterion of “is the word con-
crete?”. We made the following two more speculative predictions
regarding the effects of emotional experience on the processing
of concrete concepts in the concrete SCT. One possibility, derived
from the semantic feedback activation framework of visual word
recognition (Hino and Lupker, 1996; Pexman et al., 2002), is that
because emotional experience is diagnostic of abstract concepts, it
thus may inhibit categorization in the concrete SCT, because this
dimension is not congruent with the decision criterion of “is the
word concrete?”. An alternative possibility is that no effects of this
dimension will be observed, and this may arise either because the
effects of emotional experience may be too subtle to detect using
the type of experimental design employed in the present study
(although they may be detectable using other experimental tasks),
or they play little or no role in the processing of concrete concepts
(admittedly, this is a very strong interpretation of Vigliocco et al.’s
(2009), framework of semantic representation), or for some other
reason.
We made the following prediction regarding the effects of
emotional experience on the processing of abstract nouns in
the abstract SCT: emotional experience should facilitate catego-
rization, such that higher ratings on this dimension should be
associated with faster and more accurate categorizations, because
emotional experience is diagnostic of abstract concepts, and thus
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is congruent with the decision criterion of “is the word abstract?”.
We made the following two more speculative predictions regarding
the effects of imageability and BOI on the processing of abstract
concepts in the abstract SCT. One possibility, derived from the
semantic feedback activation framework of visual word recogni-
tion (Hino and Lupker, 1996; Pexman et al., 2002), is that because
these two dimensions are diagnostic of concrete concepts, they
thus may inhibit categorization in the abstract SCT, because these
dimensions are not congruent with the decision criterion of “is
the word abstract?”. An alternative possibility is that no effects of
these two dimensions will be observed, and this may arise for the
same reasons outlined in the paragraph above (i.e., the effects of
imageability and BOI may be too subtle to detect using the type of
experimental design employed in the present study, or they play
little or no role in the processing of abstract concepts, or for some
other reason).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Two separate groups of 30 undergraduate students from the
University of Northern British Columbia participated for bonus
course credit: one group participated in the concrete SCT and
the other group participated in the abstract SCT. All were native
English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
STIMULI
Two hundred concrete nouns and 200 abstract nouns were selected
from the Toronto Word Pool (Friendly et al., 1982) or the Paivio
et al. (1968) word banks. The concrete and abstract nouns are
listed in Concrete Nouns Used in the Experiments and Abstract
Nouns Used in the Experiments in Appendix, respectively. Con-
crete nouns had concreteness and imageability ratings of 5.0 or
higher, whereas abstract nouns had concreteness and imageability
ratings of 3.9 or less. The concrete nouns and the abstract nouns
were matched pairwise on print length. Values were obtained
for the following control variables: HAL log-frequency, Leven-
shtein orthographic distance, number of letters, phonemes, syl-
lables, and morphemes (all taken from Balota et al., 2007), age
of acquisition (AoA, taken from Kuperman et al., 2012), con-
creteness2, to control for typicality effects (as noted, taken from
either Friendly et al. or Paivio et al.), number of senses (retrieved
from the www.wordsmyth.net), and the inverse of the number
2Several studies have demonstrated the importance of typicality in semantic cat-
egorization. For example, Hampton (1997) reported that typicality accounted for
significant amounts of unique within-category variability in both categorization
latency and response probability across a variety of categories (see also, Casey, 1992;
Larochelle and Pineau, 1994; and Smith et al., 1974, for similar results). Because
the two categories used in the present study were quite broad, namely whether
nouns were concrete or abstract, we used the concreteness ratings from the Friendly
et al. (1982) and the Paivio et al. (1968) norms as typicality ratings. The instruc-
tions used in these studies included the following, “Each word was accompanied by
a seven-point bipolar numerical scale, with the extremes labeled Highly Abstract
and Highly Concrete, respectively. . .the ends of the scale were defined in terms
of abstractness-concreteness rather than low concreteness-high concreteness. . .the
present instructions stated that, ‘Any word that refers to objects, materials, or per-
sons should receive a high concreteness rating; any word that refers to an abstract
concept that cannot be experienced by the senses should receive a high abstract-
ness rating”’ (Paivio et al., 1968, p. 5). Thus, the lower ratings associated with the
of neighbor words (plus 1) within the neighborhood threshold
(NCOUNT-INV)3 (Shaoul and Westbury, 2010a,b). The seman-
tic richness variables of interest for the present study included:
emotional experience, imageability, and BOI. Emotional experi-
ence ratings and BOI ratings were collected from two separate
groups of 30 undergraduate students from the University of Cal-
gary. The instructions used for the emotional experience ratings
were derived for the present study and are given in Written Instruc-
tions Used for the Emotional Experience Rating Task in Appendix.
The instructions used for the BOI ratings were the same as those
used by Tillotson et al. (2008).
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
The 200 concrete nouns and the 200 abstract nouns were presented
in both tasks. For the concrete SCT, participants were instructed
to decide only whether each word referred to a concrete noun, and
to respond by pressing the “?” key on the computer keyboard if
the word did refer to a concrete noun and to not press any key
if the word did not refer to a concrete noun (i.e., participants
were instructed to respond only to the concrete nouns). For the
abstract SCT, participants were instructed to decide only whether
each word referred to an abstract noun, and to respond by pressing
the “?” key if the word did refer to an abstract noun and to not
press any key if the word did not refer to an abstract noun (i.e., par-
ticipants were instructed to respond only to the abstract nouns).
Participants were instructed to make their responses as quickly and
as accurately as possible, and were told that the stimuli for which
they did not make a response would be automatically replaced by
the next stimulus item after 2500 ms. The stimuli were presented
in the center of a color VGA monitor driven by a Pentium-class
microcomputer running DirectRT software4. A trial was initiated
by a fixation marker that appeared at the center of the computer
display for 1000 ms and was then replaced by a stimulus item.
The intertrial interval was 2000 ms. Stimulus order was random-
ized separately for each participant. Following every 100 trials,
participants had an opportunity to take a break, and continued
when ready by pressing the spacebar. Before beginning either task,
abstract words provided an indication of their relative “abstractness” (as was indi-
cated at the lower end of the scale), and are therefore appropriate for entry into the
analysis of the abstract categorization task data. The higher ratings associated with
the concrete words provided an indication of their relative “concreteness” (as was
indicated at the higher end of the scale), and are therefore appropriate for entry
into the analysis of the concrete categorization task data. Inclusion of these ratings
is important, because they will account for within-category variability, and there-
fore allow for a more stringent test of whether the three dimensions of experiential
knowledge account for additional categorization latency and error variability, above
and beyond that accounted for by the concreteness ratings (and the other variables
entered in the first step of the analyses).
3Shaoul and Westbury (2010a) developed the High Dimensional Explorer (HiDEx)
model of lexical co-occurrence, based on the basic architecture of the HAL model
(Lund and Burgess, 1996). One of the measures that HiDEx computes is called
NCOUNT-INV. This measure is the inverse (plus 1) of another measure HiDEx
computes, called NCOUNT, which is the number of neighbor words within a spec-
ified neighborhood membership threshold. NCOUNT-INV “has a value of 1 for
words with no neighbors and smaller values for words with more neighbors” (p.
397). It is essentially a measure of the lexical co-occurrence neighborhood size for
a given word. We used the NCOUNT-INV measure because Shaoul and Westbury
(2010a) reported that it best correlated with the SCT they used in their study (the
decision category was whether words referred to living things).
4http://www.empirisoft.com/DirectRT.aspx
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participants were given practice trials consisting of 10 concrete
nouns and 10 abstract nouns.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data from both tasks were first analyzed jointly to test for
interaction effects between task (i.e., concrete, abstract) and each
of emotional experience, imageability, and BOI. The following
variables were entered in the first step of a hierarchical mul-
tiple regression analysis: HAL log-frequency, AoA, Levenshtein
orthographic distance, number of phonemes, syllables, and mor-
phemes, concreteness, number of senses, NCOUNT-INV, type
of task (dummy coded; “1” for concrete nouns, “2” for abstract
nouns), and emotional experience, imageability, and BOI5. The
final three variables were centered prior to inclusion in the analysis
(Keith, 2006). The following interaction variables were entered in
the second step: task by emotional experience, task by imageability,
and task by BOI. These three interaction terms were constructed
by creating cross-product terms through the multiplication of the
task variable with the appropriate centered semantic richness vari-
able (Keith, 2006). To follow up any significant interactions, we
then examined the effects of emotional experience, imageability,
and BOI in each data set separately in two additional hierar-
chical multiple regression analyses. In these follow up analyses,
the following variables were entered in the first step: HAL log-
frequency, AoA, Levenshtein orthographic distance, number of
phonemes, syllables, and morphemes, concreteness, number of
senses, and NCOUNT-INV. Emotional experience, imageability,
and BOI were then entered in the second step. We used hier-
archical multiple regression because it provided two important
pieces of information, namely, the change in R2 when the three
dimensions of experiential knowledge were added to the analy-
ses (after a number of control variables were already entered),
and whether each of the three dimensions of experiential knowl-
edge accounted for a significant amount of unique variability in
semantic processing.
RESULTS
There were 10 concrete nouns (from the concrete SCT data) and
10 abstract nouns (from the abstract SCT data) that had error
rates greater than 30%. In addition, the abstract nouns justice and
moment were used as examples in the emotional experience rat-
ings instructions. Therefore, in the omnibus categorization latency
and categorization error analyses, the 10 concrete nouns and the
10 abstract nouns with high error rates, along with the two abstract
nouns used in the emotional experience ratings instructions, were
removed. Further, in the follow up analyses of the concrete SCT
data, only the 10 concrete nouns had to be removed, whereas
in the follow up analyses of the abstract SCT data, only the 10
abstract nouns and the two abstract nouns used in the emo-
tional experience ratings instructions had to be removed. The
items that were removed from the analyses are indicated with ∗
in Concrete Nouns Used in the Experiments and Abstract Nouns
5We did not include number of letters in any of the multiple regression analyses,
because of the high zero-order correlations between this variable and the Lev-
enshtein orthographic distance and number of phonemes variables for both the
concrete and the abstract noun sets.
Used in the Experiments in Appendix. Outliers were identified in
the following manner. First, categorization latencies faster than
250 ms or slower than 2000 ms were considered outliers. Second,
for each participant, categorization latencies greater than 2.5 SDs
from the mean were considered outliers. Using this procedure,
a total of 151 observations (2.6% of the data) were removed
from the concrete SCT data set, and a total of 178 observations
(3.2% of the data) were removed from the abstract SCT data set.
The raw categorization latencies were z score transformed before
analysis.
OMNIBUS ANALYSIS
Means and SDs for the predictor variables for the concrete nouns
and the abstract nouns are shown in Table 1 (note that we included
the uncentered means for the emotional experience, imageability,
and BOI variables, and that the SDs are identical whether using the
uncentered or centered means). Zero-order correlations between
the criterion variables and the predictor variables for the con-
crete SCT are presented in Table 2, and zero-order correlations
between the criterion variables and the predictor variables for the
abstract SCT are presented in Table 3. For the regression analy-
ses, the critical results are those for the three interaction tests
at step 2, and thus only these results are shown in Table 4. For
both criterion variables (categorization latencies, categorization
errors), there was a significant change in R2 when the three inter-
action terms were added to the analyses, and importantly, each
of the three interaction tests were significant. Interestingly, and
consistent with Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) framework of semantic
representation, the effects of the imageability and BOI dimensions
were in the same direction, whereas the effects of the emotional
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics and behavioral data for the 190 concrete
nouns (from the concrete SCT) and the 188 abstract nouns (from the
abstract SCT).
Variable Concrete
nouns
Abstract
nouns
M SD M SD
Log-frequency (HAL) 8.53 1.79 8.88 1.82
Age of acquisition 6.70 1.98 9.65 2.31
Levenshtein orthographic distance 2.60 0.92 2.51 0.64
Letters 7.14 1.75 7.22 1.73
Phonemes 5.67 1.66 6.15 1.65
Syllables 2.24 0.65 2.47 0.84
Morphemes 1.39 0.61 1.70 0.68
Concreteness 6.16 0.52 2.57 0.69
Senses 2.62 1.59 3.21 1.63
NCOUNT-INV 0.23 0.41 0.22 0.41
Emotional experience 2.18 0.77 3.39 1.10
Imageability 5.80 0.63 3.00 0.57
Body-object interaction 4.89 0.93 2.00 0.33
Raw categorization latencies 783.96 115.30 918.32 93.64
Categorization errors 4.09 6.91 5.44 5.94
NCOUNT-INV, inverse of number of word neighbors plus 1.
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Table 2 | Zero-order correlations between the criterion variables and the predictor variables for the concrete SCT.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. CL –
2. Errors 0.63** –
3. Freq −0.09 0.04 –
4. AoA 0.59** 0.32** −0.31** –
5. LOD 0.06 −0.10 −0.63** 0.30** –
6. Letters 0.13 −0.01 −0.58** 0.27** 0.89** –
7. Phon 0.15* −0.01 −0.50** 0.29** 0.79** 0.83** –
8. Syll 0.10 0.03 −0.42** 0.19** 0.70** 0.72** 0.78** –
9. Morph 0.04 −0.06 −0.37** 0.07 0.38** 0.48** 0.39** 0.30** –
10. Conc −0.58** −0.50** 0.14 −0.43** −0.35** −0.39** −0.46** −0.37** −0.24** –
11. Senses 0.10 0.13 0.48** −0.16* −0.33** −0.32** −0.34** −0.29** −0.20** −0.02 –
12. INV+1 −0.05 −0.11 −0.70** 0.10 0.59** 0.55** 0.48** 0.38** 0.35** −0.17* −0.36** –
13. EE 0.04 0.20** 0.39** −0.09 −0.19** −0.20** −0.15* −0.15* −0.20** −0.09 0.17* −0.30** –
14. Image −0.61** −0.49** 0.15* −0.61** −0.19** −0.22** −0.24** −0.18* −0.08 0.66** 0.04 −0.08 0.05 –
15. BOI −0.62** −0.64** −0.02 −0.37** 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.49** −0.12 0.14 0.00 0.41** –
*p<0.05, **p<0.01.
CL, categorization latency; Freq, HAL log-frequency; AoA, age of acquisition; LOD, Levenshtein orthographic distance; Letters, number of letters; Phon, number of
phonemes; Syll, number of syllables; Morph, number of morphemes; Conc, concreteness; Senses, number of senses; INV+1, inverse of number of word neighbors
plus 1; EE, emotional experience; Image, imageability; BOI, body-object interaction.
Table 3 | Zero-order correlations between the criterion variables and the predictor variables for the abstract SCT.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. CL –
2. Errors 0.42** –
3. Freq −0.26** 0.02 –
4. AoA 0.24** 0.00 −0.63** –
5. LOD 0.12 −0.07 −0.39** 0.37** –
6. Letters 0.12 −0.11 −0.39** 0.39** 0.79** –
7. Phon 0.25** −0.01 −0.42** 0.47** 0.71** 0.84** –
8. Syll 0.22** −0.04 −0.41** 0.49** 0.63** 0.70** 0.75** –
9. Morph 0.11 0.01 −0.32** 0.36** 0.49** 0.69** 0.62** 0.64** –
10. Conc 0.24** 0.39** 0.18* −0.12 −0.20** −0.16* −0.12 −0.18* −0.11 –
11. Senses −0.21** −0.09 0.47** −0.40** −0.27** −0.27** −0.30** −0.20** −0.19** 0.04 –
12. INV+1 0.22** 0.00 −0.71** 0.43** 0.24** 0.17* 0.22** 0.25** 0.20** −0.20** −0.37** –
13. EE −0.45** −0.32** 0.09 −0.28** 0.04 0.01 −0.05 −0.05 −0.12 −0.26** 0.16* −0.14 –
14. Image −0.12 −0.03 0.01 −0.24** 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.00 −0.05 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.49** –
15. BOI 0.09 0.28** 0.11 −0.26** −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.10 0.23** 0.09 −0.11 0.30** 0.43** –
*p<0.05, **p<0.01.
CL, categorization latency; Freq, HAL log-frequency; AoA, age of acquisition; LOD, Levenshtein orthographic distance; Letters, number of letters; Phon, number of
phonemes; Syll, number of syllables; Morph, number of morphemes; Conc, concreteness; Senses, number of senses; INV+1, inverse of number of word neighbors
plus 1; EE, emotional experience; Image, imageability; BOI, body-object interaction.
experience dimension was in the opposite direction. These signifi-
cant interactions mean that the regression lines for each dimension
of experiential knowledge are not parallel (i.e., they have signifi-
cantly different slopes) in the two SCTs. To better understand the
precise nature of the effects of emotional experience, imageabil-
ity, and BOI for each SCT, we conducted follow up hierarchical
multiple regression analyses separately for each data set.
CONCRETE SCT
The hierarchical multiple regression results are shown in Table 5.
(For both SCTs, the associated beta-weights and semi-partial cor-
relations for the predictor variables are given only for the step at
which they entered the multiple regression equation.) There are
two important results that should be highlighted. First, at step 1
of the analyses, concreteness had significant negative semi-partial
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Table 4 | Results of interaction tests in the omnibus analyses.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
CATEGORIZATION LATENCY
Step 1 (control variables) 0.35***
Step 2 0.14*** 0.49***
Task×EE −0.16 0.03 −0.81 −0.20***
Task× imageability 0.25 0.05 0.66 0.18***
Task×BOI 0.39 0.07 0.93 0.22***
CATEGORIZATION ERROR
Step 1 (control variables) 0.22***
Step 2 0.20*** 0.42***
Task×EE −4.05 0.64 −1.03 −0.25***
Task× imageability 3.98 1.06 0.56 0.15***
Task×BOI 10.46 1.35 1.30 0.31***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
EE, emotional experience; BOI, body-object interaction.
Table 5 | Results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the concrete SCT.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
CATEGORIZATION LATENCY
Step 1 0.55***
Freq −0.04 0.02 −0.20 −0.12*
AoA 0.08 0.01 0.43 0.35***
LOD −0.11 0.04 −0.27 −0.14**
Phonemes 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Syllables 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03
Morphemes −0.02 0.04 −0.02 −0.02
Concreteness −0.35 0.05 −0.47 −0.37***
Senses 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.11*
NCOUNT−INV −0.11 0.07 −0.12 −0.08
Step 2 0.07*** 0.62***
EE 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
Imageability −0.12 0.04 −0.19 −0.12**
BOI −0.13 0.03 −0.31 −0.24***
CATEGORIZATION ERROR
Step 1 0.39***
Freq −0.66 0.38 −0.17 −0.10
AoA 0.57 0.25 0.16 0.13*
LOD −2.43 0.83 −0.32 −0.17**
Phonemes −0.75 0.49 −0.18 −0.09
Syllables 1.67 1.03 0.16 0.09
Morphemes −1.00 0.75 −0.09 −0.08
Concreteness −7.62 0.99 −0.57 −0.45***
Senses 0.25 0.30 0.06 0.05
NCOUNT-INV −1.33 1.47 −0.08 −0.05
Step 2 0.16*** 0.55***
EE 1.85 0.51 0.21 0.18***
Imageability −2.75 0.86 −0.25 −0.16**
BOI −3.41 0.49 −0.46 −0.35***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Freq, HAL log-frequency; AoA, age of acquisition; LOD, Levenshtein orthographic distance; NCOUNT-INV, inverse of number of word neighbors plus 1; EE, emotional
experience; BOI, body-object interaction.
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correlations for both categorization latencies and categorization
errors. That is, concreteness exerted a facilitatory effect, such that
higher concreteness ratings (i.e., higher typicality ratings for the
“concrete” category, see footnote 2) were associated with faster and
more accurate categorizations (which is exactly what would be
expected from “concrete” typicality ratings). The within-category
variability accounted for by concreteness (or typicality) allowed
for a more stringent test of the effects of the three dimensions
of experiential knowledge at step 2 of the analyses. Second, and
importantly, as can be seen in Table 5, for both criterion variables,
there was a significant change in R2 when the three dimensions of
experiential knowledge were added to the analyses.
Recall that according to Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) framework
of semantic representation, sensorimotor knowledge is diagnostic
of concrete concepts. We therefore had predicted that imageability
and BOI should exert facilitatory effects in the concrete SCT. These
predictions were supported for both the categorization latency and
categorization error data, such that higher imageability ratings and
higher BOI ratings were associated with faster and more accurate
categorizations. Our predictions regarding the effects of emotional
experience were more speculative. One possibility we suggested
was that because emotional experience is diagnostic of abstract
concepts, it may inhibit categorization, because this dimension is
not congruent with the decision criterion of “is the word con-
crete?”. A second possibility we suggested was that this dimension
may exert no effects (for the potential reasons outlined above).
The data provided mixed support for the two predictions. There
was an inhibitory effect of emotional experience on categorization
errors, such that higher emotional experience ratings were asso-
ciated with less accurate categorizations, although there was no
effect of emotional experience on categorization latencies. These
results will be examined in more detail in the Discussion section.
ABSTRACT SCT
The hierarchical multiple regression results are shown in Table 6.
There are again two important results that should be highlighted.
First, at step 1 of the analyses, concreteness had significant posi-
tive semi-partial correlations for both categorization latencies and
categorization errors. That is, concreteness exerted a facilitatory
effect, such that lower concreteness ratings (i.e., higher typicality
ratings for the “abstract” category, see footnote 2) were associated
with faster and more accurate categorizations (which is exactly
what would be expected from “abstract” typicality ratings). Once
more, the within-category variability accounted for by concrete-
ness (or typicality) allowed for a more stringent test of the effects
of the three dimensions of experiential knowledge at step 2 of the
analyses. Second, and importantly, as can be seen in Table 6, for
both criterion variables, there was a significant change in R2 when
the three dimensions of experiential knowledge were added to the
analyses.
Recall that according to Vigliocco et al.’s (2009) framework
of semantic representation, emotional knowledge is diagnostic
of abstract concepts. We therefore had predicted that emotional
experience should exert facilitatory effects. This prediction was
supported for both the categorization latency and categorization
error data, such that higher emotional experience ratings were
associated with faster and more accurate categorizations. Our
predictions regarding the effects of imageability and BOI were
more speculative. One possibility we suggested was that because
these two dimensions are diagnostic of concrete concepts, they
may inhibit categorization, because they are not congruent with
the decision criterion of “is the word abstract?”. A second possibil-
ity we suggested was that these two dimensions may exert no effects
(again, for the potential reasons outlined above). The data pro-
vided mixed support for the two predictions. On the one hand,BOI
exerted inhibitory effects on categorization latencies and errors,
such that higher BOI ratings were associated with slower and less
accurate categorizations. On the other hand, imageability exerted
no effect on either categorization latencies or errors. Again, these
results will be examined in more detail in the Discussion section.
DISCUSSION
According to the PSS framework of grounded cognition, concep-
tual processing involves simulation, or the partial reenactment of
the neural states involved during bodily interaction with the envi-
ronment (Barsalou, 1999). More recently, Barsalou (2003, 2008,
2009) elaborated PSS to include the idea of situated conceptual-
ization: representations underlying conceptual knowledge include
much of the rich information associated with the environmental
contexts in which those concepts were acquired. Thus, simulation
of conceptual knowledge involves many forms of neural reenact-
ment, such as sensory, motor, and emotional neural reenactment
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).
As mentioned, the PSS framework has previously been used to
explain the effects of imageability and BOI in lexical processing.
In conjunction with PSS, the semantic feedback activation frame-
work has been used to provide a specific account for how effects
of imageability and BOI arise within the visual word recognition
system. The basic idea is that easily imageable words and high
BOI words are semantically richer, and thus they generate greater
amounts of semantic activation (i.e., richer sensory simulations
and richer motor simulations) within semantic units. Facilitatory
effects of imageability and BOI are observed in such tasks as lexical
decision and word naming because the greater amount of seman-
tic activation generated by easily imageable words and high BOI
words leads to greater semantic feedback to orthographic units
and to phonological units, which leads to faster settling of ortho-
graphic representations and phonological representations, respec-
tively. Facilitatory effects of the above dimensions are observed
in semantic categorization because the greater amount of seman-
tic activation generated by easily imageable words and high BOI
words leads to faster settling of semantic representations.
An important consideration when examining the effects of a
particular semantic dimension, particularly for the present study
in which the SCT was used, is that given the dynamic nature
of semantic processing (e.g., Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012), the
effect of any particular dimension is likely to be a function of
both bottom-up processing (e.g., semantically richer words elicit
greater levels of semantic activation) and the top-down influence
of task demands. For example, the vast majority of studies exam-
ining the effects of BOI in the SCT have used imageability (e.g.,
Wellsby et al., 2011) or concreteness (Bennett et al., 2011) decision
criteria. All these studies reported facilitatory effects of BOI. The
explanation offered is that the increased semantic activation (or
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Table 6 | Results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the abstract SCT.
Variable B SEB β sr ∆R2 R2
CATEGORIZATION LATENCY
Step 1 0.22***
Freq −0.01 0.02 −0.06 −0.03
AoA 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04
LOD −0.05 0.04 −0.12 −0.08
Phonemes 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.13
Syllables 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.09
Morphemes −0.05 0.04 −0.11 −0.08
Concreteness 0.12 0.03 0.31 0.30***
Senses −0.01 0.01 −0.08 −0.07
NCOUNT−INV 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.11
Step 2 0.15*** 0.37***
EE −0.11 0.02 −0.45 −0.35***
Imageability 0.00 0.04 −0.01 −0.01
BOI 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.16**
CATEGORIZATION ERROR
Step 1 0.17***
Freq 0.18 0.38 0.06 0.03
AoA 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00
LOD −0.55 0.94 −0.06 −0.04
Phonemes 0.05 0.44 0.02 0.01
Syllables 0.17 0.82 0.02 0.01
Morphemes 0.31 0.81 0.04 0.03
Concreteness 3.43 0.61 0.40 0.38***
Senses −0.37 0.29 −0.10 −0.09
NCOUNT−INV 1.14 1.44 0.08 0.05
Step 2 0.13*** 0.30***
EE −1.79 0.45 −0.33 −0.25***
Imageability −0.14 0.85 −0.01 −0.01
BOI 6.11 1.35 0.34 0.29***
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
Freq, HAL log-frequency; AoA, age of acquisition; LOD, Levenshtein orthographic distance; NCOUNT-INV, inverse of number of word neighbors plus 1; EE, emotional
experience; BOI, body-object interaction.
richer motor simulations) elicited by high BOI words provided evi-
dence consistent with the demands of the task (e.g., respond only
if the word is easily imageable or is concrete). However, Tousig-
nant and Pexman (2012) explicitly manipulated the instructions
given to their participants. More specifically, in three of their SCTs,
participants knew that “entity” (concrete thing) was part of the
decision category. In their first SCT, participants were instructed
to press one button for words referring to entities and another
button for words referring to non-entities. In their second and
third SCTs, participants were told to press one button for words
referring to entities and another for words referring to actions
(the order of presentation in the instructions of which buttons
to press for entity and action words were reversed in these two
SCTs). In a fourth SCT, participants were instructed to press one
button for words referring to actions and another for words refer-
ring to non-actions. Thus, in the fourth SCT, there was no explicit
mention of entities in the instructions. Tousignant and Pexman
(2012) reported facilitatory effects of BOI only for the three SCTs
in which “entity” explicitly comprised part of the decision cate-
gory. For these three SCTs, the increased semantic activation (or
richer motor simulations) elicited by high BOI words provided
evidence consistent with the demands of the task (e.g., respond in
a specific way to words referring to entities). For the fourth SCT,
the increased semantic activation (or richer motor simulations)
elicited by high BOI words did not provide evidence consistent
with the demands of the task, as it was essentially an “action ver-
sus no action” decision category, and thus no effect of BOI was
observed. This consideration of the interaction between semantic
activation and task demands will be important in our discussion
below of the nature of the effects observed in the present study.
As noted, the purpose of the present study was to examine the
effects of emotional experience, imageability, and BOI in semantic
processing for concrete and abstract nouns. According to Vigliocco
et al.’s (2009) framework of semantic representation, sensorimo-
tor knowledge should underlie the meanings of concrete concepts,
whereas emotional knowledge should underlie the meanings of
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abstract concepts. Based on this framework, we made two general
sets of predictions, which we will address in turn.
First, we predicted that when any dimension of experiential
knowledge is diagnostic of a type of concept examined in a par-
ticular SCT, the knowledge that dimension brings to bear should
be congruent with the decision criterion of that SCT, and should
thus lead to facilitation of task performance. What this means for
the present study is that in the concrete SCT, because imageabil-
ity and BOI are diagnostic of concrete concepts, higher ratings
on these two dimensions should lead to faster and more accurate
concreteness categorizations, whereas in the abstract SCT, because
emotional experience is diagnostic of abstract concepts, higher
ratings on this dimension should lead to faster and more accurate
abstractness categorizations. All these predictions were supported,
such that there were facilitatory effects of imageability and BOI
in the concrete SCT (i.e., higher ratings on these two dimen-
sions were associated with faster and more accurate concreteness
categorizations), and there were facilitatory effects of emotional
experience in the abstract SCT (i.e., higher ratings on this dimen-
sion were associated with faster and more accurate abstractness
categorizations).
These results regarding the facilitatory effects of imageability
and BOI in the concrete SCT and of emotional experience in the
abstract SCT provide one important source of support for the
idea that imageability and BOI are diagnostic of concrete concepts
and that emotional experience is diagnostic of abstract concepts
(Vigliocco et al., 2009). These results also strongly support the
idea, derived from the semantic feedback activation framework of
visual word recognition (Hino and Lupker, 1996; Pexman et al.,
2002), that when a particular dimension of experiential knowledge
is congruent with task demands, task performance is facilitated. In
other words, these results are consistent with the literature outlined
in the Introduction demonstrating that when a semantic richness
variable provides evidence consistent with task demands, semantic
categorization performance is facilitated. However, an important
and novel aspect of the present study is that we observed facilita-
tory effects of a dimension of emotional experiential knowledge
(i.e., the dimension of emotional experience) in the processing of
nouns referring to abstract concepts.
Second, we predicted that two possible outcomes could occur
when any dimension of experiential knowledge is not diagnostic
of a type of concept examined in a particular SCT. One possi-
ble outcome was that inhibitory effects would be observed, and
an alternative outcome was that no effects would be observed,
under these experimental conditions. For the present study, this
meant that either inhibitory or null effects of imageability and
BOI were expected for the abstract SCT, whereas inhibitory or
null effects of emotional experience were expected for the con-
crete SCT. The results did not provide unequivocal support for
either prediction. In the concrete SCT, there was an inhibitory
effect of emotional experience on categorization errors (higher
ratings of emotional experience were associated with less accurate
concreteness categorizations), but there was no effect on catego-
rization latencies. In the abstract SCT, there were inhibitory effects
of BOI on both categorization latencies and errors (higher ratings
of BOI were associated with slower and less accurate abstractness
categorizations), but there were no effects of imageability.
These inhibitory effects of BOI in the abstract SCT and of emo-
tional experience in the concrete SCT provide a second source
of support for the idea that motor knowledge is diagnostic of
concrete concepts and that emotional knowledge is diagnostic of
abstract concepts (Vigliocco et al., 2009). The reason for this is
that when a knowledge type is not congruent with task demands
(e.g., motor knowledge is not congruent with making abstract-
ness categorizations), the increased levels of semantic richness
(e.g., richer motor simulations) do not facilitate performance
(e.g., making abstractness categorizations). This provides some
support for the idea that simulation is an obligatory cognitive
process, and is not simply used when it may facilitate performance
(e.g., using motor simulations in the concrete SCT). However,
we emphasize that these findings and conclusions are tentative
because the results are novel, and future research will need to be
undertaken to determine whether they are reliable (i.e., can be
replicated), or are due to some theoretically uninteresting rea-
son specific to the present study (e.g., the particular stimulus
sets used).
In the present results, the concreteness (or, typicality) dimen-
sion was related to the processing of concrete nouns and abstract
nouns. As noted in footnote 2, the higher end of the concrete-
ness ratings (in the Friendly et al., 1982, and Paivio et al., 1968,
norms) can be treated as measuring more typical instances of the
category “concrete things,” whereas the lower end of the concrete-
ness ratings can be treated as measuring more typical instances
of the category “abstract things.” In the concrete SCT, there were
significant negative semi-partial correlations between concrete-
ness and categorization latency and categorization error. These
findings indicate that higher concreteness ratings (i.e., higher typ-
icality ratings of “concrete things”) were associated with faster and
more accurate categorizations. In the abstract SCT, there were sig-
nificant positive semi-partial correlations between concreteness
and categorization latency and categorization error. In this case,
these findings indicate that lower concreteness ratings (i.e., higher
typicality ratings of “abstract things”) were associated with faster
and more accurate categorizations. Thus, in both SCTs, catego-
rization was facilitated for concepts rated to be more typical of
the particular category (higher concreteness ratings for the con-
crete SCT, but lower concreteness ratings for the abstract SCT).
Including concreteness in the analyses was important, because
its inclusion allowed for more stringent tests of the effects of
the three dimensions of experiential knowledge; any overlap-
ping variability shared by these dimensions with concreteness was
credited to concreteness at the first step of the analyses. Hence,
any variability accounted for by emotional experience, image-
ability, and BOI in the present study is unique and not shared
with typicality or any other of the measures included in the
analyses.
An interesting question that the present study cannot address,
due to the go/no-go nature of the two SCTs, is what would occur
if a yes/no design were used (i.e., overt button responses are made
to both items requiring “yes” responses and to items requiring
“no” responses). More specifically, what would be the effects of
emotional experience for abstract nouns presented on “no” trials
in a concrete SCT, and what would be the effects of imageabil-
ity and BOI for concrete nouns presented on “no” trials in an
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abstract SCT? Based on the semantic feedback activation frame-
work of visual word recognition, the following predictions can
be made. First, in the concrete SCT, because emotional expe-
rience is diagnostic of abstract concepts, lower ratings on this
dimension would be associated with the noun being consid-
ered less abstract, or in other words, being considered more
concrete, which would likely lead to inhibitory effects because
these nouns would be more difficult to differentiate from con-
crete nouns. Second, in the abstract SCT, because imageability and
BOI are diagnostic of concrete concepts, lower ratings on these
two dimensions would be associated with the noun being con-
sidered less concrete, or in other words, being considered more
abstract, which would likely lead to inhibitory effects because
these nouns would be more difficult to differentiate from abstract
nouns. Of course, these predictions must await testing in future
research.
A final and important issue that was not directly addressed in
the present study was how the dimension of emotional experi-
ence may be related to other dimensions of emotionality, such as
valence and arousal, that have been used in the literature to assess
the influence of emotional knowledge in lexical processing. Kousta
et al. (2009, 2011) have demonstrated that valence and arousal sig-
nificantly influence lexical processing in the lexical decision task.
It is therefore important to examine how different measures of
emotional experiential knowledge are related and of their effects
in lexical processing.
To examine the specific issues of the relationships between the
dimensions of emotional experience, valence, and arousal, and
their effects on categorization latency and errors in the present
study, we did the following. First, we obtained valence and arousal
values from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) data-
base (Bradley and Lang, 1999), which were available for 87 of
the concrete nouns and 69 of the abstract nouns. Second, we con-
ducted separate post hoc simultaneous multiple regression analyses
for each data set. (We conducted simultaneous regression analy-
ses rather than hierarchical regression analyses because of the
reduction of statistical power due to the smaller number of stim-
uli in each analysis.) All the lexical and semantic variables that
were entered in the follow up analyses above were entered in the
post hoc analyses, along with valence and arousal. We emphasize
that these analyses are exploratory in nature, and any conclusions
that may be derived from them are tentative and must await further
experimentation.
For the concrete nouns, the zero-order correlations between
valence and arousal, valence and emotional experience, and
arousal and emotional experience were r(87)= 0.34 (p< 0.01),
0.41 (p< 0.001), and 0.57 (p< 0.001), respectively. For the
abstract nouns, the zero-order correlations between valence and
arousal, valence and emotional experience, and arousal and
emotional experience were r(69)= 0.11 (ns), −0.08 (ns), and
0.60 (p< 0.001), respectively. These correlations suggest that the
dimension of emotional experience is positively related to the
dimension of arousal for both concrete nouns and abstract nouns,
whereas it is only positively related to the dimension of valence for
the concrete nouns. The positive relationship between emotional
experience and valence is perhaps not surprising, considering
that valence was an emotional characteristic that is salient in the
instructions used to obtain the emotional experience ratings.
For the concrete SCT regression analyses, although none of the
three dimensions of emotional experiential knowledge were signif-
icantly related to categorization latencies, valence was significantly
related to categorization errors, such that higher ratings of valence
were associated with less accurate categorization (sr = 0.15). For
the abstract SCT regression analyses, only emotional experience
was significantly related to categorization latency, such that higher
ratings of emotional experience were associated with faster laten-
cies (sr =−0.39),and none of the dimensions of emotional experi-
ential knowledge were significantly related to categorization errors.
The most important finding from the post hoc regression analyses
was that although emotional experience and arousal were signif-
icantly positively correlated for the abstract noun stimulus set,
emotional experience continued to exert a facilitatory effect on
categorization latencies in the abstract SCT, even with arousal in
the analysis. This finding provides further support for the idea
that the dimension of emotional experience is a robust measure
of emotional experiential knowledge. Of course, further research
is needed to determine how this dimension is related to other
dimensions of emotional experiential knowledge, and of their
influence in visual word recognition tasks other than semantic
categorization.
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APPENDIX
CONCRETE NOUNS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
*accordion cauliflower *destroyer jitterbug person
acid chairman diamond journal picture
agent chapter dinner kitchen pitcher
alligator cherry *disease lady planet
aluminum chestnut dishwasher *laughter platform
ambassador chickenpox dollar leader player
apple chimney doorway leather poem
arrow chinchilla dragon letter police
artist chopstick eagle lieutenant pony
asparagus cigarette earthworm lion prairie
auditorium circle elbow luncheon projector
author city empire machine propeller
baby clarinet engine madam province
bacteria *climate envelope marshmallow quarter
barrel closet estate mayor railway
basement clothing *evening *meeting rattlesnake
basin coffee fabric member rectangle
bedroom collar farmer merchant refrigerator
berry college finger metal sandwich
binoculars colonel flashbulb mirror scholar
blacksmith color football mistress screwdriver
blanket column forehead *moisture secretary
body compass forest monarch sentence
building comrade fountain monastery servant
bullet concert freckles money shepherd
*business contract garden monster sheriff
butcher corner grasshopper mother sparrow
butter costume handlebars motor speaker
cabin cotton headboard mountain squirrel
canal country helmet mouthpiece station
candy couple highway navy steamer
cannon cousin hotel number stomach
canoe creature hunter orchard student
captain crocodile hurricane oven summer
cardinal crystal husband painter thermometer
carpet cupboards *illness painting trapezoid
carriage dandruff island partner treasurer
castle daughter jacket pasture tuberculosis
caterpillar daylight jellyfish penicillin window
cattle dealer jewel perfume winter
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ABSTRACT NOUNS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
aberration contrast fallacy *jeopardy prestige
ability control fantasy judgment quality
absence courage fate *justice rating
accord crisis favor knowledge reaction
*account criterion feature legend reason
advance custom feeling limit reform
adversity danger feint maker regard
advice deceit feudalism malice relief
afterlife decline figment manner request
agreement decrease folly marvel reserve
allegory deduction forethought mastery revenge
amount degree fortune meaning review
appeal delay freedom meantime satire
approach democracy future memory sensation
aptitude desire gist menace *sister
array devotion gratitude mercy situation
aspect *dijon greed merit sobriety
atrocity discipline habit method soul
attempt disclosure heredity mind spirit
attitude discretion hindrance miracle status
attribute disposition *honor *moment support
banality distraction hope mood suppression
basis distress *hour necessity suspect
belief duty hypothesis neglect temerity
betrayal eccentricity idea non-sense tendency
blandness economy ignorance nothing theory
boredom effect illusion notion tribute
capacity effort *image obedience *trifle
chance emancipation immunity obsession trouble
clemency envy impulse offense truth
comment equity inanity offer unification
comparison error incident opinion upkeep
competence essence incline opportunity value
*compound exclusion inducement outcome vanity
concept export ingratitude pacifism venture
concern expression instance pardon violation
confidence extent instant patience virtue
conflict *facility intellect perception weakness
consent factor interest perjury welfare
context failure irony pledge wonder
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS USED FOR THE EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE RATING TASK
Words differ in the extent to which they elicit or evoke an emotional experience. Some words elicit or evoke strong emotional experiences
(e.g., JUSTICE), whereas other words elicit or evoke weaker emotional experiences (e.g., MOMENT). The purpose of this experiment is
to rate words as to the ease with which they elicit or evoke emotional experience. For example, the word “justice” refers to a concept that
is associated with high levels of emotional experience (e.g., think of the emotional conditions that arise when a jury verdict is delivered,
such as joy, dismay, anger, frustration), whereas the word “moment” refers to a concept that is associated with low levels of emotional
experience (i.e., it is difficult to think of any kind of emotional experience to which this word is related). Any word (e.g., “justice”) that
in your estimation elicits or evokes high levels of emotional experience should be given a high emotional experience rating (at the upper
end of the numerical scale). Any word (e.g., “moment”) that in your estimation elicits or evokes low levels of emotional experience
should be given a low emotional experience rating (at the lower end of the scale). Because words tend to make you think of other words
as associates, it is important that your ratings not be based on this and that you judge only the ease with which a word elicits or evokes
emotional experience. Remember, all the words are nouns and you should base your ratings on this fact.
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Your emotional experience ratings will be made on a 1–7 scale. A value of 1 will indicate a low emotional experience rating, and a
value of 7 will indicate a high emotional experience rating. Values of 2–6 will indicate intermediate ratings. Please feel free to use the
whole range of values provided when making your ratings. Circle the rating that is most appropriate for each word. When making your
ratings, try to be as accurate as possible, but do not spend too much time on any one word.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Low Medium High
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